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Drought 
Donald A. Wilhite 
Drought is a normal feature of climate. Although 
scientists disagree on what constitutes a drought 
(Wilhite and Glantz, 1985: 111), it represents a 
common experience that, in a sense, binds certain 
regions together (e.g., the Great Plains). During the 
past century, the united states has been plagued by 
numerous major drought episodes (e.g., 1890s, 1930s) 
and innumerable dry spells. In fact, it is unusual for 
drought not to occur somewhere in the united states 
each year. Recent short-term droughts that have 
resulted in sUbstantial damage include the drought and 
heat wave of 1980 in the southwestern, southern, and 
central plains, and southern Corn Belt states; the 
1983 drought in the Corn Belt; the 1985 drought in the 
northern and central Great Plains and the Northeast; 
the 1986 drought in the Southeast; and the 1988 
drought in the Corn Belt and northern Great Plains 
states. 
Although severe drought generally occurs more 
frequently in some parts of the united States than 
others, no part of the nation is immune (Karl and 
Knight, 1985). Severe drought is generally associated 
with cumulative moisture deficiencies of sufficient 
magnitude that, when extended over a sUbstantial 
length of time, result in far-reaching impacts over a 
rather large geographical area. For example, the 
drought of July and August 1983 was so severe that the 
federal government designated 1,123 counties in 
twenty-two states as drought disaster areas. In 
addi tion to the designations that were made in the 
Great Plains states of Nebraska, Kansas, New Mexico, 
and Texas, the federal government also declared parts 
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of Alabama, Georgia, Virginia, west Virginia, 
Tennessee, Kentucky, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, and 
parts of most Midwest states eligible for low-interest 
disaster loans because of drought. 
The actions of the federal government in 
responding to the 1983 drought are not unique. In 
fact, these actions seem almost inconsequential when 
compared to the massive drought relief programs 
formulated in response to the major episodes of severe 
drought that have occurred in the united states during 
the twentieth century. For example, during the 
droughts of the mid-1970s the federal government was 
responsible for the largest drought relief program in 
u.s. history. The General Accounting Office (1979: 29) 
calculated the cost of the drought program to four 
federal agencies alone at more than $5 billion during 
1976-77. D.A. Wilhite and his colleagues (1984) 
estimated expenditures by all federal agencies 
involved in the response effort, plus administrative 
costs at both the federal and state level, to be $8 
billion from 1974 to 1977. 
Since each drought relief effort in the united 
states has relied, to some extent, on the precedents 
set in previous episodes, it is not surprising that 
mistakes and failures have been repeated. This chapter 
documents and evaluates efforts to respond to drought 
in 1976/77, the last major drought episode for which 
large-scale federal relief efforts are documented. 
Al though ten years have elapsed since this episode, 
little has been done by the federal government to 
prepare for, and thus respond more effectively to, the 
inevitable recurrence of severe drought in the united 
states. Considerably more progress has been made by 
state governments. Recommendations are given on ways 
to improve the effectiveness of federal and state 
governments' response to future droughts. The concept 
and advantages of drought planning and a ten-step 
planning process will be discussed. 
FEDERAL RESPONSE TO DROUGHT (1976/77) 
That the federal government would attempt to mitigate 
some of the most severe impacts of widespread drought 
during the mid-1970s was not unexpected. Droughts of 
greater intensity and duration during the 1930s and 
1950s had produced similar responses. Although the 
organizational structure for administering drought 
relief and the forms of assistance available changed 
significantly during the fifty years before the mid-
1970's drought, the fundamental approach did not. 
During the mid-1970s, the Federal Disaster 
Assistance Administration (FDAA) was responsible for 
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administering grants to presidentially declared 
disaster areas from the president's disaster relief 
fund. Moreover, FDAA was responsible for directing and 
coordinating the assistance efforts of all federal 
agencies (FDAA, 1975). The number of federal disaster 
assistance programs available in 1975 was extensive. 
Few, if any, of these programs had been designed 
specifically to respond to problems caused by drought. 
The actions of state and federal agencies that 
resulted in response to the drought of 1976-1977 are 
described in detail below. Table 9.1 provides a 
chronology for these actions. 
The 1976 Federal Drought Response 
The first federal actions were initiated during the 
last year of the Ford administration in response to 
requests from Governor Richard F. Kneip and 
Representative James Abdnor of South Dakota in July 
1976. The governor requested federal agencies to 
provide maximum assistance to the severely stricken 
drought areas in his state (Kneip, 1976). This request 
prompted the president to direct the Domestic Council 
to review the socioeconomic impacts of drought in the 
Dakotas, Minnesota, and Wisconsin and to determine if 
additional assistance could be provided under existing 
federal laws and programs (May, 1976). The governor's 
letter was followed by a request from Representative 
Abdnor to the secretary of agriculture for the 
creation of a special task force to review and improve 
current drought assistance programs (Abdnor, 1976). In 
response to Abdnor's request, a special cabinet-level 
drought committee was formed by the president in late 
October. The committee's objectives included the 
development of a drought monitoring scheme and a 
comprehensive plan and program for delivering short-
term assistance to drought-affected areas. 
The special cabinet-level drought committee 
reported to President Ford on December 28, 1976. By 
this time, 325 counties had been declared emergency 
disaster areas. Basically, the report provided a 
summary of federal response to date, a status report 
of the current situation, and an indication of problem 
areas. The committee's findings suggested that current 
programs IImay not be able to cope effectively if the 
situation deteriorates much further" (Bell, 1976). The 
report concluded that, IIwhen drought occurs it is 
difficult to determine the nature and extent of 
federal assistance required, and some emergency 
programs are not designed to cope with agricultural 
drought. II 
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Table 9.1 
State and Federal Response to the 1976/1977 Drought 
ActionlDate 
1976 
Request for action from South 
Dakota governor and others--July 
Request by Rep. Abdnor (South 
Dakota) for tha creation of a 
drought task force--July 
1977 
States form regional alliances, 
Western Governors' Task Force on 
Regional Policy Management meets 
to discuss drought conditions--
January 
Western governors meet with 
Secretary Andrus--January 
Federal drought coordinator requests 
drought-related Information from 
13 federal agencles--February 
Presidential drought packaga for 
$844 million submItted to Congress 
--March 23 
Formation of an Interagency Drought 
Coordinating Committee to designate 
Emergency Drought Impact Areas 
under the president's drought 
program--Aprll 
Drought conditions Improve between 
April and August In tha Great Plains 
and Upper Midwest states, and by 
December In the Far West states 
Response/Date 
Domestic Council directed by President 
Ford to review socioeconomic Impact--
September 
President Ford appoints special cablnet-
level task force--October Task force 
Issues report·-December 
Western States Water Council begins 
10 monitor droughl·-January 
Commitments by federal and state 
governmenls for Action; President ClIrlP.r 
and governors arpolnt drought 
coordinators--January to early March 
Drought appraisal reporl prepared under 
leadership of Ihe U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers for submission to President 
Carter--mld-March 
Droughl package passed almost Intacl by 
Congress, except for two Items--Aprll to 
early May 
2,145 counties declared Emergency Drough 
Impact Areas by this committee between 
April 25 and September 12 
Federal drought assistance estimated 
between $7 and 8 billion lor 1976/77 
The drought committee's report reached President 
Ford on January 3, 1977, seventeen days before the end 
of his term in office. The committee's report provided 
only a cursory examination of the drought problem and 
did not deal with the questions of long-term policy 
ci ted among the committee's original obj ecti ves. As 
table 9.2 shows, the report included a tabulation 
indicating federal assistance in presidentially 
declared emergency areas up to December I, 1976. 
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Federal drought response during the Ford 
administration is best summarized as reaction-
oriented. Little if any planning was done to develop 
alternative actions for possible future conditions. No 
new programs were developed and no coordinated effort 
was made to respond to deteriorating conditions. 
The 1977 Federal Drought Response 
In January 1977, regional alliances put added 
political pressure on Washington for action. On 
January 23, 1977, the Western Governors' Task Force on 
Regional Policy Management met to discuss the scope 
and magnitude of the western drought (WESTPO, 1978). 
Following this meeting, the lead agency for water 
policy and development, the Western states Water 
Council (WSWC), began to monitor the drought situation 
at regular intervals. The governors met with the 
secretary of the interior, Cecil Andrus, to discuss 
state needs and federal actions to mitigate the 
societal impact of drought. Although many areas of the 
nation were entering their second, and a few locations 
their third, consecutive year of drought, this was the 
first such joint discussion of mitigation alternatives 
by state and federal officials. 
The meeting with Secretary Andrus concluded with 
several commitments by the secretary and the 
governors. The secretary agreed to seek the 
appointment of a federal drought coordinator and to 
encourage the president to discuss the drought issue 
at the National Governors Conference. The governors 
also agreed to consider the need for alternative 
approaches to cooperative, multilateral drought 
response actions and to designate state drought 
coordinators. 
In response to these initiatives, President 
Carter appointed Jack Watson to be federal drought 
coordinator. One of Watson's first actions was to 
request each of thirteen federal agencies to prepare a 
report by March 3 (a lead time of less than one week) 
that would include: (1) a brief evaluation of the 
impacts and drought-related problems in each agency's 
area of responsibility; (2) a list and description of 
drought assistance programs; (3) a statement of 
administration or funding problems; (4) an evaluation 
of complaints from state and local governments and 
drought victims; and (5) suggestions of legislative 
changes or initiatives that might help to better 
organize and deliver federal assistance in support of 
state and local government efforts (Watson, 1977). 
The agency reports submitted to Watson totaled 
several thousand pages and were, not surprisingly, 
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lacking in uniformity and consistency. Watson 
recognized the inability of his staff to restructure 
the raw information provided by the agencies into a 
format that would be useful in the decision-making 
process (Kallaur, 1977). The u.s. Army Corps of 
Engineers was asked to coordinate this assimilation 
process. The Corps accepted this task and completed it 
within one week, as directed. The thirteen reporting 
agencies became known as the White House Drought study 
Group. The Drought Appraisal Report, as it was called, 
was completed on March 18 and served as the basis for 
President Carter's drought program. 
The Drought Appraisal Report described drought 
conditions in the united states and addressed 
questions of water conservation, water supply 
augmentation, and management measures; it also 
suggested possible immediate mitigating actions. The 
report concentrated heavily on drought impacts in the 
Far West, sometimes to the point of downplaying, if 
not neglecting, those areas plagued by extreme drought 
in the Midwest and northern plains states. 
Federal response activities continued to expand 
during March as drought conditions intensified and 
encompassed larger geographic areas. Emergency loans 
from FmHA were made available to 706 counties in 
twenty-seven states. Livestock feed assistance was 
provided in 436 counties in twelve states by ASCS. By 
the end of March FDAA was providing aid to sixteen 
states, by presidential declaration, through three 
assistance programs (FDAA, 1977). The three programs 
provided assistance for hay transportation, cattle 
transportation, and emergency feed. USDA was 
responsible for coordinating most of the assistance 
activities in the agricultural sector. 
President Carter sent a request to Congress on 
March 23 for $844 million in loans and grants for 
farmers, ranchers, communities, and businesses 
stricken by drought. The president's request for this 
program was passed intact by Congress, except for the 
Small Business Administration legislation and a 
reduction in funds, from $225 to $175 million, for the 
Economic Development Agency (EDA) loan and grant 
program (Crawford, 1978: 143). The water bank bill was 
signed by the president on April 7. Other portions of 
the "package" were delayed until early May. Program 
funds were to be expended or committed by September 
30, 1977. 
Table 9.2 
Federal Grant and Loan Programs Providing Assistance in Disaster Areas 
Through December 1, .1976 
Agency/Program Applications Estimated Applications 
Received Amount Pavments 
Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, DHUD 
Hay and Cattie Transportation Assistance 18,456 $83,312,926 9,701 
Smail Business Administration 
Economic Injury Disaster Loans 31 $1,101,500 19 
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, USDA 
Disaster Payment Program 151,869 $172,050,000 70,712 
Emergency Uvestock Feed Program (now being phased 
out due to lack of CCC-owned feed grain stocks) N/A $4,300,000 N/A 
Farmers Home Administration, USDA 
Emergency Loans 7,300 $207,263,000 2,956 
Economic Development Administration, DOC 
Economic Development-Special Economic Development 
and Adiustment Assistance Prooram 22 Undetermined" 8 
~: Bell, 1976. 
'Partial payments on some applications 
"Amount to be determined after further evaluation 
~: 
Amount 
Paid 
$7,154,121" 
$701,500 
$65,497,000 
$4,300,000 
$133,263,000 
$1 556 000' 
This summmary reflects applications for grants and loans received and funds requested therein following the presidential 
emergency declarations and through November 1976 in the States of Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Virginia, 
and Wisconsin. Eleven counties in Arkansas were declared eligible for assistance on December 3, 1976. The data contained 
herein was limited to assistance provided in the areas covered by the presidential emergency declarations due to drought. 
The assistance included in this report was provided through emergency and regular program authorities. 
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In April the Interagency Drought Coordinating 
Committee (IDCC) was created. The major function of 
IDCC was to designate areas eligible for federal 
assistance. This federal assistance, however, referred 
only to programs authorized in President Carter's 
"drought package." Members of IDec included 
representatives of the u.s. Department of Agriculture 
(chairman), the Small Business Administration and the 
Departments of Interior and Commerce. Geographic areas 
designated by IDCC were referred to as Emergency 
Drought Impact Areas (EDIAs). 
During the first formal meeting of IDCC, held on 
April 25, 1977, the committee designated 1183 counties 
as EDIAs. Of these, 842 had already received 
presidential or secretarial declarations (Stockton, 
1977) . The EDIAs were located in 24 western and 
midwestern states. The list of declarations grew 
during the summer months. By September 12, 1977, the 
date of the last declaration, 2,145 counties (70 
percent of all counties in the united States) were 
included as EDIAs. These designations were to expire 
on September 30. 
In the early stages of IDCC there were no 
distinct criteria for the designation of EDIAs. At 
least half of the counties designated during this time 
period were so designated with no supporting 
documentation. The need for such criteria was 
discussed during the third meeting of IDCC on May 3. 
It was agreed that ASCS would draft a list of 
criteria, which was presented to and approved by the 
committee on May 20. The list included the Palmer 
Drought Severity Index (PDSI) . This index was 
apparently the principal criterion used by IDCC to 
determine eligibility for drought assistance (General 
Accounting Office, 1979: 29). 
Considerable confusion appears to have developed 
over IDCC designations. Many federal and state 
officials assumed that counties were automatically 
eligible for all federal programs after they had been 
designated by IDCC. Although it is not so specified in 
the original memorandum of agreement, IDCC 
designations were intended to apply only to programs 
included in the presidential drought package. 
Following IDCC designation, counties automatically 
became eligible for only one of the many drought 
package programs, FmHA' s Emergency Loan Program. To 
qualify for other programs in the package, counties 
had to meet the special eligibility requirements of 
each program. Eligibility for programs not included in 
the presidential drought package was determined on a 
program-by-program basis and was not linked to IDCC 
designations. 
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The only distinction between IDCC-designated and 
non-IDCC counties was that the former had access to 
the special drought funds associated wi th the 
president's drought package. IDCC designations were 
sweeping, usually focusing on states rather than 
individual counties. The detailed, county-level 
evaluation process was left to the several involved 
federal agencies. 
Although the presidential drought package was 
sUbstantial ($844 million)--one of the largest single 
appropriations for drought relief in the nation's 
history--it represented only a small portion of the 
total federal drought assistance program. Forty 
programs were available to provide assistance to the 
private sector during 1976/77. However, six programs 
accounted for the vast maj ori ty of funds disbursed: 
(1) the Farmers' Home Administration's Emergency Loan 
Program; (2) the Small Business Administration's 
Disaster Loan Program; (3) the Department of 
Commerce's Community Emergency Drought Relief Program; 
(4) the Bureau of Reclamation's Emergency Fund 
Program; (5) the Bureau of Reclamation's Emergency 
Drought Program; and (6) the Farmers' Home 
Administration's Community Program Loans and Grants. 
The authorizations and activities associated with each 
of these programs during the 1976/77 drought have been 
summarized in a General Accounting Office report 
(1979: 29) entitled "Federal Response to the 1976-77 
Drought: What Should Be Done Next?" GAO reported that 
the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Interior 
and SBA alone administered more than $5 billion in 
drought relief programs to water users during 1976/77. 
However, if the cost of programs administered by other 
federal agencies is included, as well as the cost of 
the relief programs of 1974 and drought-related 
administration costs to states during 1974-77, the 
total cost of the drought to the government can be 
conservatively estimated at $7 to 8 billion (Wilhite 
et aI., 1984). 
IMPROVING FEDERAL RESPONSE TO DROUGHT 
In view of the experiences of the mid-1970s and 
previous drought relief efforts, certain lessons 
emerge about ways to improve governmental response to 
periods of widespread and severe drought. Based on the 
foregoing information, four basic requirements for 
more effective response by federal government are 
suggested: (1) reliable and timely information and 
dissemination plans; (2) objective and reliable impact 
assessment procedures; (3) obj ecti ve and timely 
designation procedures; and (4) appropriate disaster 
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programs and efficient program administration and 
delivery systems. 
Information Products and Dissemination Plans 
The drought response efforts of the mid-1970s were not 
based on adequate and systematic provision of timely 
information on drought conditions and impacts to 
persons and agencies invol ved in administering 
programs. Although the availability of reliable, 
current, and properly formated information does not 
ensure correct and timely decisions on the part of 
government officials, it is at least reasonable to 
believe that good decisions are less likely to be made 
on the basis of inadequate or incorrect information. 
Many types of information are needed during 
periods of drought if the wide-ranging impacts 
associated with water shortages are to be adequately 
addressed. For example, meteorological data is 
necessary to describe the degree of water shortage and 
to identify those geographical areas most affected. 
Such data, in conjunction with information on soil 
moisture conditions, can be used for early projections 
of yield. Commodity prices, in conjunction with 
projected yield figures, can be used to estimate 
monetary losses for principal grain, vegetable, and 
hay crops. Data on stream flow and ground water 
depletion rates provide important information on the 
outlook for water supply to the agricultural, 
municipal, and industrial sectors. 
A common requirement for all types of drought-
related information is that it be reliable, 
effectively organized, and timely. In almost all cases 
during the mid-1970s' drought, government agencies did 
not make assessments of the drought situation until 
drought conditions had reached critical proportions. 
To improve the ability of government to respond 
effectively in times of drought, the drought situation 
and its consequent impacts must be continually 
monitored. Since weather data form the basis for 
virtually all other assessments, special attention 
should be given to providing relevant observations of 
precipitation and calculations of evapotranspiration 
and soil moisture status. Networks of automated 
weather stations (such as the one developed in 
Nebraska, South Dakota, Colorado, Kansas, Wyoming, and 
Iowa under partial support of the National Climate 
Program Office) can provide the data needed for the 
aforementioned calculations. This network currently 
provides near-real time data for seven meteorological 
parameters--solar radiation, wind direction and speed, 
precipitation, humidity, temperature, and soil 
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temperature (Hubbard et al., 1983: 213; Hubbard, 1987: 
97) . 
Regional automated weather networks in drought-
prone areas and terrestrial sensors in space can 
provide the data base for drought early warning and 
surveillance systems. Atmospheric scientists have a 
significant contribution to make in the improved 
collection and interpretation of weather data for 
drought management. 
Impact Assessment Procedures 
A long-standing problem in responding to drought has 
been the lack of reliable procedures for assessing 
probable impact. Because drought normally has its most 
immediate and sUbstantial impact on the agricultural 
sector, improved techniques for assessing, in near-
real time, the impact of weather conditions on crops 
and rangeland should greatly improve our ability to 
identify (and therefore speed assistance to) areas 
affected by drought. 
Historically, the most common government 
cri terion to identify areas stricken by drought has 
been amount of normal precipitation. This information 
and local reports of crop, pasture and livestock 
conditions, and human distress were used extensively 
during the 1930s and 1950s. 
During 1976/77 POSI was used by federal agencies 
and IOCC to establish eligibility of areas for drought 
relief (General Accounting Office, 1979: 29). A map 
showing the distribution of POSI values was (and is) 
published regularly in the Weekly Weather and Crop 
Bulletin. POSI is intended to describe long-term 
moisture conditions. More recently, the Crop Moisture 
Index (CMI) , a modification of POSI and more 
agriculturally appropriate, has been used by federal 
agencies to assess short-term moisture conditions 
(Palmer, 1968: 157; National Weather Service, 1977). 
CMI was not widely used during 1976/77. 
POSI has been increasingly criticized in recent 
years by scientists (Changnon, 1980: 5; Wilhite, 1983: 
22; Alley, 1984: 22). Inconsistencies have been noted 
between POSI and actual severity of the drought 
impacts observed. There are several reasons for the 
lack of agreement between calculated POSI values and 
actual drought severity, particularly with respect to 
agricultural drought. Specific crop responses to 
drought were not considered in the derivation of the 
index, nor do they figure in the calculation of index 
values. Yet, POSI is used, qualitatively, to assess 
drought impacts on crops. Additionally, the 
Thornthwaite method (Thornthwaite, 1948: 38) of 
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estimating evapotranspiration (ET) is used in the 
calculation of PDSI values. The Thornthwaite method is 
unable to account for sensible heat advection, a major 
source of the energy that drives the ET process in the 
Great Plains region. Thus, there is concern that the 
Thornthwaite method severely underestimates ET in 
subhumid and semiarid regions (Rosenberg et al., 1983) 
and, accordingly, that the PDSI tends to overestimate 
the amount of water remaining in the soil (Smith, 
1983) . 
Regional differences in land use and cropping 
systems should be considered in the impact assessment 
issue. For example, a PDSI of -3.0 in July may signal 
substantial reduction in yield of nonirrigated corn 
because of destruction of reproductive tissue. Were 
moisture conditions to improve, corn yield would still 
be low but soybeans, whose reproductive activity 
continues through much of the growing season, may 
produce near-normal yields. 
Clearly, new techniques must be developed to 
enhance our drought impact assessment capability. 
Impacts are most precisely estimated on a crop-
specific basis. Agricultural meteorologists and 
agronomists, working together, have the skills needed 
to develop crop-specific drought indices. Automated 
weather data networks are now providing the data to 
support the development and operation of these indices 
in some drought-prone regions. These data can also 
support numerous other assessment-related activities 
of state government. Therefore, states should play an 
important role in supporting the development and 
maintenance of these networks. 
Drought Designation Procedures 
The development of objective and timely procedures to 
determine eligibility for federal disaster assistance 
is a necessary condition for the improvement of 
government response to drought. Although standby 
legislation and response plans may reduce delays in 
program formulation and implementation, the lack of 
appropriate designation procedures and reliable, 
objective criteria on which to base those designations 
hampers the delivery of programs to the affected area 
and leads to ineffective response. 
Procedures for designating counties eligible for 
assistance have changed with each drought episode. 
During a particular episode, procedures may have been 
al tered in response to deteriorating weather 
conditions. Changes in political administration in the 
middle of a drought can also be expected to result in 
changing designation procedures. During the mid-1970s' 
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drought the procedure for designating counties 
eligible for disaster assistance was more complicated 
and confusing than it had been in previous droughts, 
partly because more agencies and committees were 
invol ved in administering the programs (Wilhite et 
al., 1984). 
The General Accounting Office (1978: 95) has 
summarized the sUbstantial differences in the disaster 
declaration procedures used by major agencies--FmHA 
and SBA--during 1977. The effect of these differences 
in disaster declaration procedures was such that, 
during the period July 1977 through January 1978, FmHA 
and SBA operated their programs in forty-five and 
fourteen states, respectively. Within states where 
both agencies operated, certain counties were covered 
by only one of the two agency programs. 
One examination and evaluation of the function, 
procedures, and actions of IDee has identified several 
specific problem areas (Wilhite et al., 1984). First, 
the existence and precise function of IDee were poorly 
understood by government officials, especially at the 
state level. In many cases, designations by the 
committee were interpreted by government officials as 
an automatic qualification of their state or county 
for all federal disaster assistance programs. FmHA's 
Emergency Loan Program was the only government program 
actually enabled by IDee action. 
Second, IDee designations were broad and 
sweeping, and impacts identified by states were not 
verified by the committee on the basis of a common set 
of objective data. No IDee evaluation criteria were 
actually available until early June, and then they 
were not widely understood. Of the 2145 counties 
designated by IDee between April 25 and September 12, 
1977, approximately 1575, or 73 percent, were approved 
before the criteria had been properly defined. 
Although entire states were often designated by IDee, 
actual impact areas were of limited geographical 
extent. For example, the primary impact area in 
Nebraska in 1977, in terms of production losses of the 
principal grain crops, was confined to a nine-county 
area in the extreme southeastern corner of the state. 
IDee designated the entire state (ninety-three 
counties) on April 25. These sweeping designations 
provided many counties throughout the nation not 
affected by the severe drought with access to FmHA 
emergency loans. This action also led to the illusion 
of a severe nationwide drought. Such an illusion can, 
in the long run, be detrimental to the establishment 
of drought relief programs. 
Third, the criteria established by IDee were not 
fully reliable for the purpose of identifying affected 
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areas, although they were probably the best available 
at the time. Assessments by federal agencies were 
improvised from the data at hand. However, these 
needed data were not available to the committee that 
was charged with evaluating all requests for 
assistance. Also, the data available to the committee 
was, in some cases, out of date. Therefore, decisions 
were, at times, based on information that may not have 
represented the situation accurately. 
Disaster Programs, Administration, 
and Delivery systems 
As many as forty separate programs were available to 
provide assistance to drought victims in the form of 
loans, grants, and insurance during the mid-1970s (see 
table 9.3). These programs can be clustered into two 
broad categories. The first included short-term 
actions to avoid or lessen the impact of drought by 
augmenting water supplies. This was the primary 
objective of President Carter's drought program. The 
second group involved programs designed to make loans 
to farmers to compensate them for production losses 
and to provide them with working capital. The wide 
range of assistance programs available reflects the 
variety of groups and economic sectors affected by 
drought and the lack of a coordinated federal disaster 
response plan. 
Two characteristics of these disaster programs 
can be noted. First, only a few of the programs 
available in the mid-1970s were designed to address 
the specific problems associated with drought. Rather, 
they were orginally formulated by Congress to respond 
to problems of soil and water conservation and to 
other natural disasters such as flooding. Second, 
other than the on-going programs implemented in 
response to previous twentieth-century drought 
episodes (e. g., Great Plains Conservation Program), 
the programs of the mid-1970s were intended to be 
short-term or tactical. No new long-term program 
initiatives were instituted during this period. 
The General Accounting Office (1979: 29) 
indicated four major problem areas in its study of the 
programs and the administration of programs that were 
part of the 1976/77 federal drought response effort. 
First, several drought programs were enacted too late 
to lessen the effects of drought. For example, 
President Carter's drought program did not receive 
congressional approval until April and, in some cases, 
May. In the Far West it had been apparent since 
January 1977 that a water shortage would occur during 
the irrigation season. As another example, delays in 
Handbook of Emergency Management/162 
congressional approval also sharply reduced the 
effectiveness of certain programs. For example, $75 
million was authorized to the Bureau of Reclamation 
for the Water Bank Program. However, only $4.8 million 
was spent in this manner because most growers of 
lower-value annual crops had already planted by the 
time the program was implemented. It was too late to 
reallocate water to the higher-value perennial crops. 
Second, many projects that were approved violated 
congressional intent to augment water supplies on a 
short-term basis. Several projects were initiated so 
late that water could not be supplied during the 
drought for which the aid had been given. construction 
of other projects did not even begin until after the 
drought had ended. Also, drought loans and grants 
appear to have been used to provide a low-cost source 
of federal financing for nondrought-related projects. 
Third, eligibility and repayment criteria for 
emergency drought programs were inconsistent, 
inequi table, and confusing. Al though sUbstantial 
differences in criteria existed between many disaster 
programs, the differences between the FmHA's Emergency 
Loan Program and SBA's Disaster Loan Program are, 
perhaps, the most interesting because they were 
directed to the same target groups. (For specific 
differences between these two programs, see the 1978 
GAO report). Loans obligated through the two programs 
totaled $4.63 billion during 1976/77. 
Fourth, inadequate coordination among agencies 
led to program overlap and nonuniform standards for 
determining eligible drought relief projects. GAO 
cites several specific examples of loan applicants 
applying to two agencies. In some cases, applications 
were approved by both agencies, and applicants could 
choose the loan with the most favorable terms. 
The General Accounting Office (1979:29) concluded 
its examination of the 1976/77 federal drought 
response effort with the recommendation that Congress 
direct the four primary agencies administering 
assistance programs (USDA, SBA, Departments of 
Interior and Commerce) to assess the problems 
encountered in providing emergency relief. Based on 
the findings of this assessment, GAO recommended that 
a national drought plan be developed to provide 
assistance in a more timely, consistent, and equitable 
manner. According to GAO, this plan should identify 
the respective roles of agencies to avoid the overlap 
and duplication that has been associated with previous 
drought response efforts. GAO recommended that 
Congress consider legislation that would more clearly 
define those roles. GAO also recommended standby 
legislation (i.e., authorizing assistance programs) to 
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permit more timely response to drought-related 
problems. 
In light of past experiences, the recommendations 
of GAO appear eminently sensible. The number of 
agencies participating in drought assistance 
activities during 1976/77, as well as the number of 
programs available, indicates the obvious need for an 
assessment and response plan organized under the 
leadership of a single agency. In the process of 
developing such a plan, all disaster assistance 
programs should be reviewed in terms of their 
consistency, efficiency, and equity, as well as their 
relevance in dealing with the problems and impacts 
associated with drought. Most assistance programs were 
originally developed to address problems resulting 
from the occurrence of natural hazards other than 
drought or in response to specific water supply 
problems. During droughts these programs have simply 
been redirected. Also, more attention needs to be 
given to alleviating drought impact and facilitating 
recovery in the agricultural sector. 
Multidisciplinary studies should be initiated to 
define the impacts of past droughts. In addition, 
scenarios should be used to help evaluate probable 
impacts of future drought. The results of such studies 
could aid in identifying real needs for drought 
assistance programs, reduce the number of such 
programs, and lead to improved efficiency in their 
administration. 
DROUGHT POLICY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS 
The Goals and Objectives of Drought policy 
The underlying question in this discussion is: Should 
government be involved in providing assistance to 
those economic sectors or persons that experience 
hardship in times of drought? Because of the 
frequency, severity, and spatial extent of drought, 
governments in the united States and elsewhere have 
elected to provide assistance through a wide range of 
measures. These drought assistance measures are the 
instruments of a de facto policy that has evolved over 
the past fifty years. The decision on whether to 
provide aid has been based more often on political 
than economic reasoning. Thus, government involvement 
in drought relief seems to be a political reality, and 
one that should be dealt with in a more effective and 
efficient manner. 
Previous discussion has concentrated on 
government response to a recent episode of widespread, 
severe drought in the united states. This drought 
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relief effort has been shown to be largely 
ineffective, poorly coordinated, and untimely. 
Governments have reacted to, rather than prepared for, 
recurrent and inevitable episodes of drought. 
For purposes of contingency planning, the goals 
of government drought policy must be stated 
explicitly. without clearly stated drought policy 
goals, contingency planning will lack direction and 
purpose. Also, the effectiveness of drought assessment 
and response actions will be difficult to evaluate. 
Three goals for drought policy are proposed here. 
First, assistance measures should not discourage 
agricultural producers, municipalities, and other 
groups from adopting appropriate and efficient 
management practices to help alleviate the effects of 
drought. Second, assistance should be provided in an 
equitable, consistent, and predictable manner to all 
without regard to economic circumstances, industry, or 
geographic region. Third, the importance of protecting 
the natural and agricultural resource base must be 
recognized. Although these goals may not be achievable 
in all cases, they do represent a model against which 
recent drought policies and measures--the instruments 
of that policy--can be evaluated. Drought policy goals 
are also the foundation of any planning effort by 
federal and state governments. 
The specific objectives of drought policy will, 
of course, vary between levels of government and from 
country to country. In the united States, for example, 
the objectives of a national drought policy might be: 
1. To prepare an organizational structure for 
assessing and responding to drought-related 
problems and water shortages 
2. To develop standby legislation that 
adequately addresses the impacts of drought 
through relevant assistance measures 
3. To encourage and support basic and applied 
research leading to the development of 
appropriate management strategies for all 
drought-prone regions 
4. To foster and support water planning and 
management activities at both the state and 
regional level 
To be successful, whether in the united States or 
elsewhere, drought planning must be integrated within 
the national and state--or provincial--levels of 
government, involving existing regional (mul tistate) 
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organizations as well as the private sector where 
applicable. At the national level in the united 
states, however, the diversity of impacts associated 
wi th drought and the multi tude of federal agencies 
with responsibility for drought assessment and 
response make it difficult for a single federal agency 
to assume leadership in the development of a national 
drought assessment and response plan. The development 
of a national policy requires an interagency approach 
in these instances, under the leadership of a single 
agency. For this as well as other reasons, such as 
unique local water management problems, wilhi te and 
his colleagues (1986: 22) have suggested that where a 
complex federal bureaucratic structure exists, as it 
does in the united states, drought planning efforts 
may be most effective if first initiated at the state 
level. In other settings, such as in less-developed 
countries, the drought planning process may be 
coordinated more easily at the national level since 
the bureaucratic structure may be less formidable. 
The objectives of drought policy at the state 
level will differ from those at the national level, 
reflecting the unique physical, environmental, 
socioeconomic, and political characteristics of a 
particular area. For example, drought policy 
objectives might be: 
1. To develop a monitoring system that provides 
early warning of impending drought 
conditions and impacts 
2. To develop an organizational structure that 
enhances drought preparedness and response 
by linking levels of government 
The development of the organizational structure 
referred to in the second objective will provide the 
necessary integration with drought policies at the 
national level and should ensure adequate coordination 
between the two levels. 
Regional actions should be directed toward 
fulfilling at least three objectives: 
1. To improve data collection and dissemination 
efforts between states 
2. To identify or establish a regional 
organization to facilitate much of the 
drought planning effort and to improve 
coordination and cooperation within and 
between levels of government 
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3. To develop a strategy whereby the designated 
organization can focus federal attention on 
drought-stricken areas so that they receive 
appropriate assistance in a timely manner 
Successful regional drought planning efforts have 
three prerequisites. First, the governors of the 
region in question must be convinced of the advantages 
of risk versus crisis management. This usually 
requires an event or series of events (i.e., the 
occurrence of a severe drought) to first capture their 
attention. An intensive educational effort must then 
be directed toward these decision makers. Second, 
states must have the full cooperation of federal 
agencies. Water planning and management is a complex 
problem, one whose solution involves all levels of 
government. Federal agencies can play a key role in 
identifying and implementing solutions to these 
problems. Third, drought planning should begin at the 
state level and then progress to the regional and 
national level. States that are cooperating in a 
regional planning effort must first establish the 
necessary institutional infrastructure within their 
state. This action will facilitate the planning effort 
at higher levels of government. 
DROUGHT POLICY FEATURES 
The principal features of drought policy are grouped 
into three categories: organization, response, and 
evaluation. 
Organizational features are planning activities 
that provide timely and reliable assessments, such as 
a drought early warning system, and procedures for a 
coordinated and efficient response, such as drought 
declaration. These characteristics would be the 
foundation of a national or state drought plan. Only a 
few states in the United states have drought plans 
(Wilhite and Wood, 1985: 21). 
Response features refer to assistance measures 
and associated administrative procedures that are in 
place to assist individual citizens or businesses 
experiencing economic and physical hardship because of 
drought. Numerous assistance measures are available in 
the united States, but few are intended specifically 
for drought. An all-risk crop insurance program has 
been evolving in the United states since 1939 (Federal 
Crop Insurance Corporation, 1980), although the level 
of participation by farmers is quite low. 
Evaluation of organization procedures and drought 
assistance measures in the postdrought recovery period 
is the third category of drought policy features. 
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Governments in some countries (e.g., Australia) have 
been more conscientious in their evaluation of recent 
drought response efforts. In the united States, the 
government does not routinely evaluate the performance 
of response-related procedures or drought assistance 
measures. An evaluation of the 1976/77 drought 
response activities was made by the General Accounting 
Office (1979: 29) at the request of the chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural 
Resources, the late Congressman Leo J. Ryan. Wilhite 
and his colleagues (1984) evaluated government 
response to the mid-1970s' drought under the 
sponsorship of the National Science Foundation. These 
were the first systematic evaluations of federal 
drought response efforts in the United states. Earlier 
efforts were only documentations of federal, and 
possibly state or private, involvement in drought 
relief, avoiding judgments of its effectiveness 
(Murphy, 1935; U.S. Executive Office of the President, 
1959) . 
DROUGHT PLANNING: WHAT IS IT? 
Drought planning can be defined as actions taken by 
government, industry, individual citizens, and others 
in advance of drought for the purpose of mitigating 
some of its effects. Drought planning should include, 
but is not limited to, the following activities: 
1. A monitoring/early warning system to provide 
decision makers at all levels with 
information about the onset, continuation, 
and termination of drought conditions and 
their severity 
2. Operational assessment programs to reliably 
determine the likely impact of the drought 
event 
3. An institutional structure for coordinating 
government actions, including information 
flow within and between levels of government 
and drought declaration and revocation 
criteria and procedures 
4. Appropriate drought assistance programs with 
predetermined eligibility and implementation 
criteria 
5. Financial resources to maintain operational 
programs and to initiate research required 
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to support drought assessment and response 
activities 
6. Educational programs designed to promote the 
adoption of appropriate drought mitigation 
strategies among the various economic 
sectors most affected by drought 
As figure 9.1 illustrates, drought planning has 
been described by D. A. Wilhite and W. Easterling 
(1987) as a ten-step process. This process is intended 
to be flexible so that it can be easily adapted to 
many sociopolitical situations and levels of 
government. continuous evaluation and updating of the 
procedures included within each step of the process 
are recommended to ensure that the plan remains most 
responsive to the needs of the region involved. This 
process should be useful to governments desiring to 
implement some level of drought contingency planning 
activity. 
FEDERAL AND STATE DROUGHT PLANNING: 
CURRENT STATUS 
Earlier in this chapter, four basic requirements were 
suggested as necessary to improve the effectiveness of 
federal drought response efforts: (1) reliable and 
timely information and dissemination plans; (2) 
obj ecti ve and reliable impact assessment procedures; 
(3) obj ecti ve and timely designation procedures; and 
(4) appropriate disaster programs and efficient 
program administration and delivery systems. A 
national drought plan has been suggested as the best 
way to attain significant progress in each of these 
four areas. 
Although debate on the need for a national 
drought plan continues, no movement toward the 
development of such a plan has occurred. Some 
improvement in the delivery of reliable and timely 
information to decision makers during the 1988 drought 
can be noted. Much of the credit for this improvement 
must be given to the leadership provided by the Joint 
Agricul tural Weather Facility of the U. S. Department 
of Agriculture and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration. However, the actions of 
government in responding to widespread and severe 
drought remain uncoordinated because of the lack of an 
organizational structure within the federal 
government. Clearly, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) must play a major coordinating role in 
this effort. It should also be recognized that the 
speed with which the Congress passed the 1988 drought 
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relief legislation can be attributed largely to an 
election year spirit of cooperation among members of 
Congress. If drought continues into 1989, impacts will 
be even more pervasive, requiring more comprehensive 
assistance programs. Such bipartisan actions should 
not be expected in future droughts. A national drought 
policy needs to be established that defines goals and 
objectives of federal drought assessment and response 
programs. 
Figure 9.1 
A Ten·Step Drought Planning Process 
Appointment of 
Drought Task Force 
(STEP 1) 
Statement of Purpose 
and Objectives 
(STEP 2) 
Inventory of Natural and Human 
Resources, Financial Constraints 
(STEP 3) 
Development of Drought Plan 
(STEP 4) 
Identification of Research Needs 
and Institutional Gaps 
(STEP 5) 
Synthesis of Drought Management 
Science and Policy 
(STEP 6) 
Identification of Response Options 
(STEP 7) 
Implementation of Drought Plan 
(STEP 8) 
Development of Educational 
and Training Programs 
(STEP 9) 
Development of 
System Evaluation Procedures 
(STEP 10) 
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state governments in the united states have 
typically played a passive role in assessing and 
responding to drought. This was certainly the case in 
the mid-1970s and in earlier drought episodes as well. 
In recent years, state governments across the nation 
have made impressive strides in preparing for drought-
related water shortages. For example, in 1982 only 
three states had prepared formal drought plans--
Colorado, South Dakota, and New York. At present, 
about twelve states have plans and another ten states 
are developing plans. certainly, the widespread 
occurrence of severe episodes of drought in the united 
states over the past decade, and especially since 1985 
in the Southeast and Far West, has demonstrated the 
vulnerability of our society to drought impacts and 
highlighted the importance of government actions as a 
mitigation tool. 
Today, a number of resources are available that 
can help state governments prepare for the recurrence 
of drought. First, states can learn from the planning 
experiences of other states. The Colorado Drought Plan 
is probably the most duplicated approach. Second, a 
model drought plan developed by the Western States 
Water Council in the fall of 1987 helped many Western 
states hastily assemble some plan of action in 1988. 
This model is based on the Colorado plan but 
incorporates ideas and elements from other plans. 
Finally, the ten-step planning process referred to in 
the previous section of this chapter provided some 
focus and direction to a few states during 1988. This 
ten-step process is now being expanded with funding 
from the National Science Foundation to incorporate a 
model drought plan that will be applicable to all 
regions of the united states (Wilhite and Easterling, 
1988). The availability of this model in the spring of 
1989 should facilitate the development and revision of 
plans in drought-prone areas. 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. government often responds to drought through 
crisis management. This was the case in the mid-1970s 
as well as in previous episodes of widespread and 
severe drought. In crisis management the time to act 
is perceived by decision makers to be short. Reaction 
to crisis often results in the implementation of 
hastily prepared assessment and response procedures 
that lead to ineffective, poorly coordinated, and 
untimely response. If planning were initiated between 
periods of drought, the opportunity would exist to 
develop an organized response that might more 
effectively address issues and specific problem areas. 
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Also, the limited resources available to government to 
mitigate the effects of drought might be allocated in 
a more beneficial manner. 
In 1979 the General Accounting Office recommended 
the formulation of a national drought plan to provide 
assistance in a more timely, consistent, and equitable 
way to drought-affected areas (GAO, 1979: 29). GAO 
proposed that this plan identify the respective roles 
of agencies involved in drought response to avoid 
overlap and duplication; the need for legislation to 
more closely define these roles; and the need for 
standby legislation to permit more timely response to 
drought-related problems. 
This chapter has identified four requirements for 
effective response to drought by government. First, 
reliable and timely information on drought conditions 
and drought-related impacts must be developed and 
properly assembled and disseminated. This requires 
near-real time meteorological data on which 
informational products can be based. Second, impact 
assessment techniques must be improved. In the case of 
agriculture, usually the first economic sector to 
experience the hardships of drought, new types of 
analyses must be developed to provide decision makers 
at all levels with the types of information necessary 
to understand the severity of drought and its impacts 
so that appropriate actions can be implemented in a 
timely manner. Third, designation procedures must be 
centralized under a single agency or committee with 
complete authority to determine eligibility for all 
assistance programs. Cri teria must be determined in 
advance of drought, well-publicized when drought 
occurs, and applied in a consistent manner. Finally, 
assistance programs must be developed in advance of 
drought to avoid the delays in program formulation and 
congressional approval that occurred in the mid-1970s. 
These programs should be administered by a single 
agency through the mechanism of an interagency 
committee composed of representatives from all federal 
agencies with responsibility in drought assessment and 
response. State and/or regional representatives should 
be included in the membership of this committee. 
Assistance programs must address the specific problems 
associated with drought. 
GAO's recommendation for a national drought plan 
has considerable merit. For such a plan to be 
effective, however, states must take a more active 
role in planning for drought. In the past, most states 
have played a passive role, relying almost exclusively 
on the federal government to rescue residents of the 
drought area. Although federal government has, for 
lack of an alternative, accepted this role, improving 
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government response to drought requires a cooperative 
effort. states must develop their own organizational 
plans for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating 
information on drought conditions. This information 
should form the basis for more objective and timely 
assessments of impact. Today, more than twenty states 
have developed or are developing drought plans. Each 
plan is unique, reflecting the water supply 
characteristics and problems of the state and 
potential impact areas. However, state plans should be 
linked to a national drought plan through the 
interagency committee(s) with responsibility for 
drought designation and program administration. 
Because of the limited resources available to states, 
they can be expected to provide only a minimal level 
of financial assistance to drought disaster victims. 
One unique aspect of the mid-1970s' drought was 
the effectiveness of regional organizations of states 
in focusing the attention of federal government on the 
problem. The Western Region Drought Action Task Force, 
the Western Governors' Policy Office, and the Western 
states Water Council, working in concert, were able to 
make a more unified representation to federal 
officials. This lesson should not be forgotten. 
Regional organizations are sure to play an even more 
important role in the future. 
It is proposed that drought planning efforts be 
ini tiated at various levels of government and that 
these efforts be closely coordinated. A ten-step 
planning process is proposed that is adaptable to each 
level of government and should facilitate the 
development of drought plans. Regional organizations, 
such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Ohio River 
Basin Commission, and the Western Governors 
Association, must be included in this planning 
process. Regional organizations should consider 
centralizing their monitoring and assessment 
activities as one means of improving the efficiency 
and accuracy of information flow to the federal 
government and, by so doing, increasing their 
influence on drought policy. 
REFERENCES 
Abdnor, J. (1976). Letter to secretary of Agriculture 
Earl Butz, August 24, Gerald R. Ford 
Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
Alley, W. M. (1984). "The Palmer Drought Severity 
Index: Limitations and Assumptions," Journal 
of Climate and Applied Meteorology 23. 
Drought/173 
Bell, R. E. (1976). Letter to President Ford, December 
28, Official Secretary of Agriculture files, 
Records Section, Washington, D.C. 
Changnon, S. A. (1980). "Removing the Confusion over 
Droughts and floods: The Interface between 
Scientists and Policy Makers," Water 
International 5. 
Crawford, A. B. (1978). "State and Federal Responses 
to the 1977 Drought, " in ",N-"o",r,-,t,,-,h'-O-----,,-,A=m=e=r=--l=.· .=;c."a=n 
Droughts, ed. N. J. Rosenberg (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview, AAAS Selected Symposium 
15) . 
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (1980). An Inside 
Look at All-Risk Crop Insurance (Washington, 
D.C.: Federal Crop Insurance Corporation). 
Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (1975). 
FDAA Digest (Washington, D. C. : Federal 
Disaster Assistance Administration) . 
(1977). FDAA Bimonthly Report (March 31). 
General Accounting Office (GAO) (1978). Difficulties in 
Coordinating Farm Assistance Programs 
Operated by Farmers' Home Administration and 
the Small Business Administration 
(Washington, D. C.: U. S . General Accounting 
Office) . 
(1979). Federal Response to the 1976-77 Drought: 
What Should Be Done Next? (Washington, D.C.: 
General Accounting Office) . 
Hubbard, K. G.; N. J. Rosenberg; and D. C. Nielsen 
(1983). "Automated Weather Data Network for 
Agriculture," Journal of Water Resources 
Planning and Management 109. 
Hubbard, K. G. (1987). "Surface Weather Monitoring and 
the Development of Drought and Other Climate 
Information Delivery Systems," in Planning 
for Drought: Toward a Reduction of Societal 
Vulnerability, eds. D. A. Wilhite and W. E. 
Easterling (Boulder, Colo.: Westview). 
Kallaur, W. (1977). "Memo for Members of the Drought 
Study Group" (March 11). 
Karl, T. R., and R. W. Knight (1985). "Atlas of 
Monthly Palmer Hydrological Drought Indices 
for the Contiguous uni ted States, " 
Historical Climatology Series 3-6 (1895-
1930) and 3-7 (1931-1938), National Climate 
Data Center, Ashville, N.C. 
Kneip, R. F. (1976). Letter to President Ford, July 
11, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Mich. 
May, F. L. (1976). Letter to Governor Kneip, August 
11, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Mich. 
Murphy, P. G. (1935). Drought of 1934: The Federal 
Government's Assistance to Agriculture, 
Handbook of Emergency Management/174 
report to the President's Drought Committee, 
July 15, Washington, D.C.: National 
Agricultural Library, Beltsville, Md. 
National Weather Service (1977). Memo to Recipients of 
Technical Procedures Bulletin No. 204: Crop 
Moisture Index, National Weather Service, 
Silver Springs, Md. 
Palmer, W. C. (1968). "Keeping Track of Crop Moisture 
Conditions Nationwide: The New Crop Moisture 
Index," Weatherwise 157. 
Rosenberg, N. J.; B. L. Blad; and S. B. Verma (1983). 
Microclimate: The Biological Environment, 2d 
ed. (New York: Wiley). 
Smith, D. T. (1983). "A Comparison of Techniques for 
Estimating Potential Evapotranspiration in 
Nebraska," CAMaC Progress Report 83-6, 
Center for Agricultural Meteorology and 
Climatology, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 
Stockton, B. (1977). Memo to Cliff Ouse Concerning 
Emergency Drought Impact Designation, July 
6, Washington, D.C., Official Secretary of 
Agriculture files, Records section, 
Washington, D.C. 
Thornthwaite, C. W. (1948). "An Approach Toward a 
Rational Classifiacation of Climate," 
Geographical Review 38. 
U.S. Executive Office of the President (1959). 
"Drought, a Report," Washington, D.C. 
Watson, J. (1977). Memo to John F. O'Leary, Federal 
Energy Administration, reply to drought 
information request, February 25, Official 
Secretary of Agriculture files, Records 
Section, Washington, D.C. 
WESTPO (1978). Managing Resource Scarcity: Lessons 
from the Mid-Seventies Drought (Denver, 
Colo.: Western Governors' Policy Office). 
Wilhite, D. A. (1983). "Government Response to Drought 
in the U.S. with Particular Reference to the 
Great Plains," Journal of Climate and 
Applied Meteorology 22. 
(1986). "Drought Policy in the U.S. and Australia: 
A Comparative Analysis," Water Resources 
Bulletin 22: 425-438. 
Wilhite, D. A., and W. Easterling (1987). Planning for 
Drought: Toward a Reduction of Societal 
Vulnerability (Boulder, Colo.: Westview). 
Wilhite, D. A., and M. H. Glantz (1985). 
"Understanding the Phenomenon of Drought: 
The Role of Definitions," Water 
International 9. 
Drought/175 
Wilhite, D. A., and D. A. Wood (1985). "Planning for 
Drought: The Role of state Government," 
Water Resources Bulletin 22. 
Wilhite, D. A.; N. J. Rosenberg; and M. H. Glantz 
(1984). "Government Response to Drought in 
the united states: Lessons from the Mid-
1970's," Center for Agricultural Meteorology 
and Climatology Progress Reports, 84-1 TO 
84-4, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 
Wilhite, D. A.; N. J. Rosenberg; and M. H. Glantz 
(1986) . "Improving Federal Response to 
Drought," Journal of Climatology and Applied 
Meteorology 25. 
